

Qubes OS Architecture

Paper by Joanna Rutkowska &
Rafal Wojtczuk




Presentation by Matt Burrough
(burrogh2@illinois.edu)

The Problem

- Today's OSes are inherently insecure
- Complex APIs
- Kernel Mode Exploits
- User Mode Exploits
- Fixing one flaw too reactionary
- Zero Days


Qubes Concept

- Segment portions of the OS into individual VMs (domains)
- Hypervisors more secure
- Hardware VT adds extra security
- Tie all domains together with a GUI




Implementation

- Xen Hypervisor
- Dom0 Administrative Domain
- Network (NIC) Domain
- Storage Domain
- 1+ AppVM domains





IF SOMEONE STEALS MY LAPTOP WHILE I'M
LOGGED IN, THEY CAN READ MY EMAIL, TAKE MY
MONEY, AND IMPERSONATE ME TO MY FRIENDS,
BUT AT LEAST THEY CAN'T INSTALL
DRIVERS WITHOUT MY PERMISSION.

- <http://xkcd.com/1200/>




Networking





VPN Domain



Attack Vectors

- 1- vs. N-stage attacks
- Flaw in the Hypervisor
- Flaw in the GUI code
- Attack against Disk Drivers
- Attack against NIC driver

Related Works

- Windows SteadyState
 - <http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=4310>
- Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Security and Functionality in a Commodity Hypervisor
 - <http://www.sigops.org/sosp/sosp11/current/2011-Cascais/printable/14-colp.pdf>
- Citrix XenApp / TS RemoteApp
 - <http://www.citrix.com/products/xenapp/overview.html>
 - <http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc730673%28v=ws.10%29.aspx>

Discussion Questions

- Does the shared clipboard and ease of moving files between domains compromise security?
- Do you agree with the decision to host the GUI system in the administrative domain?
- Do you think the Qubes concept would offer an improvement in security for a typical computer user? Consider that the user now potentially needs to patch multiple instances of an OS to keep all of the VMs up to date.
- In which types of environments do you foresee this OS model working well?